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ABSTRACT
THE SENSITIVITY OF LOAN GROWTH AND THE
EXISTENCE OF BANK LENDING CHANNEL
DURING THE NEW REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT IN TURKEY
Kus¸akcıog˜lu, Zeynep Go¨zde
M.A., Department of Management
Supervisors: Assoc. Prof. Su¨heyla O¨zyıldırım
January 2010
Theoretical framework for monetary transmission mechanism and hence for
bank lending channel provides straightforward impacts of monetary policy
on aggregate output, however there is a problem of identification for these
impacts with aggregate data. Using a two-staged approach, the thesis studies
the loan growth sensitivities of banks in the new regulatory system in Turkey
and tries to identify a relationship between loan growth sensitivity and mone-
tary tightening. There are six alternative sensitivities tested in the thesis: (1)
Liquidity sensitivity of bank loan growth, (2) Income sensitivity of bank loan
growth, (3) Liquidity sensitivity of bank loan growth with ownership type
of banks controlled, (4) Liquidity sensitivity of large banks loan growth, (5)
Liquidity sensitivity of small banks loan growth. (6) Liquidity sensitivity of
bank loan growth with foreign affiliation of banks controlled. Results confirm
that there exists a positive relationship between liquidity sensitivity of loan
iii
growth of Turkish banks and monetary policy shocks. Results also show that
small banks are more liquidity dependent during contradictionary monetary
policy periods than large banks. Besides the results parallel to empirical find-
ings in the literature, characteristics of Turkish banking sector are included in
the discussion such as the influence of BRSA on banks and the impacts of its
regulations. Robustness of the tests are checked with additional econometric
models. Hence, the findings suggest that there are evidences on bank lending
channel in Turkey for the period 1998-2009.
Keywords: Bank Lending Channel, Liquidity Sensitivity, Loan Growth.
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O¨ZET
TU¨RKI˙YE’DEKI˙ YENI˙ DENETLEME ORTAMINDA
KREDI˙ BU¨YU¨ME HASSASI˙YETI˙ VE BANKA
KREDI˙ KANALININ VARLIG˜I
Kus¸akcıog˜lu, Zeynep Go¨zde
Yu¨ksek Lisans, I˙s¸letme Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Doc¸. Dr. Su¨heyla O¨zyıldırım
Ocak 2010
Para aktarım mekanizmasını ve dolayısıyla banka kredileri kanalını olus¸turan
teorik yapı, para politikalarının u¨lke u¨retimine yapacag˜ı etkiler konusunda
anlas¸ılır bir ac¸ıklama getirmektedir. Ancak bu etkileri verilerle belir-
lemek aras¸tırmacılar ic¸in bir sorun olmaktadır. Bu tez, iki as¸amalı
bir ekonometrik yaklas¸ımla banka kredilerindeki bu¨yu¨me hassasiyetlerini
Tu¨rkiyedeki yeni du¨zenleme ortamında aras¸tırmakta ve para arzındaki daral-
malarla banka kredilerinin bu¨yu¨me hassasiyetleri arasında bir ilis¸ki bulmayı
amac¸lamaktadır. Tezde incelenen altı alternatif hassasiyet tu¨ru¨ vardır: (1)
Banka kredi bu¨yu¨melerinin likiditeye olan hassasiyeti. (2) Banka kredi
bu¨yu¨melerinin nakit akıs¸ına olan hassasiyeti. (3) Bankaların mu¨lkiyet tu¨rleri
kontrol edilerek banka kredi bu¨yu¨melerinin likiditeye olan hassasiyeti. (4)
Bu¨yu¨k bankaların kredi bu¨yu¨melerinin likiditeye olan hassasiyeti. (5) Ku¨c¸u¨k
bankaların kredi bu¨yu¨melerinin likiditeye olan hassasiyeti. (6) Bankaların
yabancı bankalar ile ortaklıkları kontrol edilerek banka kredi bu¨yu¨melerinin
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likiditeye olan hassasiyeti. Elde edilen sonuc¸lar, Tu¨rkiyede banka kredi
bu¨yu¨melerinin likidite hassasiyetlerinin para arzındaki s¸oklarla pozitif bir
ilis¸kisi oldug˜unu onaylamaktadır. Sonuc¸lar ayrıca, para arzında daralma
oldug˜u do¨nemlerde ku¨c¸u¨k bankaların likiditeye bu¨yu¨k bankalara nazaran daha
bag˜ımlı oldug˜unu go¨stermektedir. Literatu¨rdeki ampirik bulgulara paralel
bulguların yanı sıra, BDDK’nın ve BDDK tarafından getirilen du¨zenlemelerin
etkileri gibi Tu¨rkiye bankacılık sistemine o¨zgu¨ o¨zellikler de tezde yer almak-
tadır. Yapılan testlerin gu¨venilirlikleri bas¸ka ekonometrik modellerle test
edilmis¸tir. Bu¨tu¨n bu sonuc¸lar ıs¸ıg˜ında, 1998-2009 do¨nemi ic¸in Tu¨rkiye’de
banka kredileri kanalının var oldug˜u bulgusuna rastlanmaktadır. Anahtar
Kelimeler: Banka Kredi Kanalı, Likidite Hassaslıg˜ı
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The soundness of the financial institutions is key part of the infrastructure for
strong macroeconomic performance and effective monetary policy at the na-
tional level. Central banks and governments pay increasing attention to mon-
itoring the health of the financial institutions and markets, and to macroe-
conomic and institutional developments that pose potential risks to financial
stability.
Among the core principles for banking supervision by Basle Committee,
the first principle emphasizes that an effective system of banking monitoring
and supervision must have clear responsibilities and objectives for each agency
involved in the supervision of banks. In most of the developed and develop-
ing countries, the governance of the financial system had traditionally been
performed by the Central Banks. In addition to several advantage of bank
supervision in the Central Bank (Peek et al., 1999; Di Noia and Di Giorgio,
2002), the major disadvantage of assigning to Central banks the joint respon-
sibility for the functions of conducting monetary policy and bank supervision
is the conflict of interest argument (Oosterloo and de Haan, 2004; Vilmunen,
2008; De Graeve, Kick, Koetter, 2008). It is mainly argued that a trade-off
may exist among monetary stability and stability of banks. For example,
monetary authority might wish for higher interest rates (e.g. to maintain
an exchange rate peg, to bear down on inflation, or to reduce the pace of
monetary growth) while the regulatory authorities are frightened about the
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adverse effect such higher rates may have upon the bad debts, profitability,
capital adequacy and solvency of the banking system (Goodhart and Shoen-
maker, 1992). Since late 1990s, a definitive separation of the monetary and
supervisory authorities has become more popular.
Turkey’s financial system and its banking sector are virtually synonymous.
Since early 2000s, increasing intermediation role of banks and separation of
monetary and supervisory authorities in Turkey may create an interest for
understanding of the existence of monetary transmission on the real econ-
omy not directly through the impact of interest rate on the aggregate demand
but indirectly through shifts in the supply of bank loans. Peek and Rosen-
gren (1995) show that both regulatory and monetary policy could alter the
amount of bank lending that affects investments of private firms. Moreover,
the findings of this thesis may create more interest considering the fact that
as the banking sector opens to foreign entry, policymakers, central bankers
and regulatory authorities should be aware of the possibility that business
spending may become more volatile and sensitive to their interventions.
Monetary policy and its effects on real economy have long been examined.
As a whole, these analyses make up the literature on the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism. The patterns of this mechanism by which the changes in
monetary policy affect real output are also referred as channels of monetary
transmission mechanism and various channels have been identified. One of
these channels is the bank lending channel - also called the narrow credit
channel. As its name indicates, in this channel, the monetary policy changes
affect real output through the channel of bank loans. This channel places
emphasis on banks in the economic structure and focuses on loan demand
and supply changes when monetary policy changes. Although the name of
the channel is narrow, there is a broad literature for this channel and the
focus of the thesis is on a specific segment of this literature.
As briefly mentioned above, the main interest of this thesis is to investigate
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the bank lending channel of the monetary transmission mechanism in Turkey.
This interest is motivated by the developments in Turkish banking system in
the past decade: The financial crisis of 2000-2001, rehabilitation programs and
regulations operationalized by Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency
(BRSA) since 2000, restructuring of state-owned banks and increase in the
loan demand/supply in Turkish banking sector. These changes in the sector
have led Turkish banks to act in a new regulatory environment with changing
dynamics. Therefore, their loan supply and lending strategies have changed to
adapt to the new regulatory environment. For example, the share of loans in
total assets increased from 27% at the end of 2001 to 48% by December 2009.
Government securities, which used to dominate the asset side of the banking
sector, were overtaken by loans as an asset class in banks’ books during
2005. Hence, the bank lending channel for Turkish banks is an interesting
investigation for the decade 1998 to 2009.
Due to new regulation regarding the measurement and assessment of liq-
uidity, liquid assets over total assets is around 30% as of December 2009.
However, given the short-run maturity of the banks’ funding base and the
fact that all banks still have considerable amount of government securities
on their balance sheets, liquidity could become a problem in times of sys-
tematic stress. Hence, in this study, we aim to understand to what extent is
the Turkish banking sector is ready to withstand a monetary shock through
credit channel. More precisely, we examine the banking sector’s sensitivity
to interest rate shocks.
Among different strategies developed to examine the existence of bank
lending channel, one group of studies focuses on the loan growth sensitivity
of banks (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Campello, 2002; Cetorelli and Goldberg,
2008). In these studies, the impact of monetary policy shocks on loan growth
sensitivities of banks is tested. Bank characteristics are also added to the em-
pirical models. Especially size, liquidity and capitalization are considered to
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study the influence of cross-sectional differences among banks on loan growth
when there exists a contradictionary monetary policy. Following these stud-
ies, the motivation of the thesis is to test loan growth sensitivity of Turkish
banks and to study the importance of different bank characteristics for loan
growth sensitivity. While conducting these tests, the main objective is to
identify the relationship between monetary policy changes and loan growth
sensitivities. Another objective is to test significance of different portfolio
choices of banks in terms of their loan growth sensitivity. Liquidity and cash-
flow proxies will be used in the econometric tests to fulfill this objective. A
third objective will be to capture specific conditions of Turkish economy and
banking system. In this way, the main objective of this thesis to provide a
better understanding of the effects of the new regulatory environment and
monetary policy changes on the Turkish banking system will be remained.
Control variables and dummy variables will be included in the models with
the intention of controlling or emphasizing country specific conditions.
Final objective of the thesis is to test differences between large and small
banks in terms of their loan growth sensitivities. Since their portfolios and
funding opportunities may differ, there is evidence on small banks’ higher
sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. Kashyap and Stein (2000) showed that
small banks are more sensitive (or dependent) to their liquid funds when
there is monetary tightening. Small banks have limited access to external
funds in contradictionary monetary policy periods. Hence their possibility
to make loan provisions is lower than that of large banks. Large banks, on
the other hand, are argued to absorb the impact of monetary shocks since
there are alternative funding options for large banks. These options decrease
their sensitivity (or dependence) on liquidity, hence the impact of monetary
tightening on their loan growth is low or absent.
Alternative models of the thesis utilize the two-staged least squares regres-
sion (2SLS) method to achieve the aforementioned objectives. This method
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introduced by Kashyap and Stein (2000). The first stage is a cross-sectional
regression conducted on bank level data. The aim of this stage is to obtain an
estimate for sensitivity of banks to a specific bank characteristic.1 And the
second stage links sensitivities of banks with monetary policy changes. This
step is a time-series regression hence macroeconomic indicators and mone-
tary policy indicators are regressed on sensitivities obtained in the first step.
This two-step identification strategy links monetary policy shocks with loan
growths indirectly. Therefore it is not possible to interpret the results ob-
tained from this strategy in terms of the magnitude of the impact of shocks.
The focus of the strategy is to identify a relationship which is addressed as a
“problem” and stated as the premise of Kashyap and Stein’s study (2000:408).
Two-stage identification strategy is found to be significant and robust
and yields positive relationship between liquidity sensitivity of loan growth
and monetary policy changes according to the tests conducted in the thesis.
Both the econometric models and robustness checks identify an impact of
monetary shocks on liquidity of banks. This relationship cannot be identified
for the cash flow sensitivities of Turkish banks. Hence cash flow is found
to be less (or not) influential on banks’ lending strategies when monetary
policy changes. Besides the impact of monetary policy changes on 20 deposit
banks, there are differences between large and small banks in terms of their
sensitivities. Small banks are found to be more dependent to their liquid
funds in contradictionary monetary policy periods than large banks. Hence
the results confirm the evidence found in literature. It is also observed that
the influence of BRSA in the new regulatory period is significant in most of
the econometric models. Overall, the existence of bank lending channel in
Turkey is identified within several limitations due to mainly scarcity of data
for the period 1998-2009.
1Kashyap and Stein (2000) obtain liquidity sensitivities in the first step and Cetorelli
and Goldberg (2008) follow them. On the other hand, Campello (2002) uses cash-flow
proxy to obtain income sensitivity of banks.
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The following chapter reviews literature for monetary transmission chan-
nels. Section 2.2, briefly overviews the theoretical framework for bank lending
channel and the role of bank characteristics in cross-sectional differences of
banks and their loan supply. Chapter 3 overviews the Turkish banking sector
and the regulatory environment for period of 1998-2009. Chapter 4 explains
the data and methodology and suggests hypotheses and expected results.
Chapter 5 summarizes the empirical results and robustness checks. Chapter
6 concludes the thesis with policy implications.
6
CHAPTER 2
MONETARY
TRANSMISSION
MECHANISM
Most researchers agree on the significant influence of monetary policy on the
real economy. There are evidences on the impact of the changes in monetary
policy on real output. (Friedman and Schwarz, 1971) However, there are
varying views on which route this impact follows to reach the real output.
And these views together define monetary transmission mechanism. The
mechanism through which changes in the monetary policy influence the real
economy is called monetary transmission mechanism. Meltzer’s (1995:49-50)
explanation for this transmission process is “businesses and households fall
into a misperception of past and current actions of monetary policy makers.
And they respond to changes with relative price, interest rate, exchange rate
and/or output level changes.” These relative changes are the channels of
monetary transmission mechanism. In this section, we first distinguish the
channels of monetary policy transmission, then concentrate on narrow lending
channel (see Figure 2.1 for summary of these channels).
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Figure 2.1: Summary of Monetary Transmission Mechanism Channel
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2.1 Monetary Transmission Channels
2.1.1 Interest Rate Channel - Textbook View
The classical view on monetary transmission mechanism advocates that mon-
etary policy changes affect aggregate demand through interest rates. In this
view, changes in money supply leads to changes in interest rates. More pre-
cisely, when a contractionary monetary policy is pursued, interest rates rise.
Hence, the cost of borrowing increases which leads investors to reduce or post-
pone their investment spending or households to defer consumption. Thereby,
the aggregate demand declines and eventually output declines.
M ↓=⇒ i ↑=⇒ I ↓=⇒ Y ↓ (2.1)
This channel is implied by the traditional IS/LM model introduced by
Hicks in 1937 and takes part in most intermediate macroeconomics textbooks.
Besides the supporters, there are strong criticisms on this view:
1. It is found to be very restrictive and mechanical. It is argued that there
should be some other changes in the real economy besides the interest
rates. (Meltzer, 1995:51)
2. Traditional IS/LM model assumes a two-asset world. Either money is a
substitute for financial assets or there is money on one side and real and
financial assets on the other. For the latter case, it is still assumed to be
a two asset world because real assets and financial assets are assumed
to be perfect substitutes. In consequence, textbook view fails to explain
major events. Brunner and Meltzer’s (1995:446) suggestion is “a joint
determination of bank credit, money stock, interest rate and the price
level of real assets”.
3. It is claimed to be a puzzling reasoning on the impact of short term
interest rates and long term interest rates. The impact of short term
9
rates versus long term rates is unclear. Short-term rates are relevant for
the demand of money, and long-term rates are relevant for investment
and capital accumulation. In the model, it is not clear whether the
single rate is short-term or long-term interest rate.
4. There is no role for financial intermediaries.
5. Many of the changes in short term interest rates are transitory distur-
bances that do not affect spending decisions. However, IS/LM model
does not capture these transitory movements.
6. Interest rate view assumes no externalities or market imperfections.
In this view, the least productive investments are postponed or left
unfunded. However, this is not the real case, there is some degree
of market imperfections that cause wrong investments to be made or
productive investments to left unfunded (Cecchetti, 1994:5).
2.1.2 Exchange Rate Channel
Globalization and emergence of flexible exchange rates give rise to significant
impact of exchange rates on the economy, since net exports and economic
output are influenced by exchange rates. Thus, higher attention has been paid
on the exchange rate channel in monetary transmission mechanism literature.
Exchange rate channel is related with interest channel because the rise in
interest rates triggers currency appreciation:
M ↓=⇒ i ↑=⇒ E ↑=⇒ NX ↓=⇒ Y ↓ (2.2)
where E ↑ is the appreciation of the domestic currency. Net exports decline
as E increases, because domestic currency is now more valuable and this in-
creases the value of domestic goods. Domestic goods become more expensive
relative to foreign goods, thereby net exports decrease and causes aggregate
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demand and output to decrease. Taylor’s study (1995) concentrates on the
large impact of short term interest rates on exchange rates.
2.1.3 Tobin’s-q Theory
Tobin (1969) discusses the impact of equity prices on transmission process:
M ↓=⇒ Pe ↓=⇒ q ↓=⇒ I ↓=⇒ Y ↓ (2.3)
where Pe is the equity price and q is the ratio of market value of firms to
replacement cost of capital. Tobin argued that equity prices fall when money
supply declines. Since investors have less money than they desire to have,
they compensate by postponing or reducing investment spending. Thus, eq-
uity demand falls which lowers equity prices. From the Keynesian viewpoint,
contractionary monetary policy causes interest rates to increase as in interest
rate channel. Therefore bonds become more attractive than alternative equi-
ties. Hence, equity prices decline due to a decrease in equity demand. Hence
both views expect a fall in equity prices.
Impact of q is the core interest of Tobin’s study. When q is high, new
plants and equipments are cheaper relative to the market value of business
firms. Businesses choose to invest and thereby I ↑. On the other hand,
when q is low, market values of firms are cheaper relative to new plants and
equipments. Businesses find it more profitable to buy existing firms than
investing in new plants and equipment. Hence, I ↓. When there is monetary
tightening, Pe falls and since the nominator of q is market value of firms,
decline of equity prices reduces q. As a result, aggregate output declines.
2.1.4 Wealth Channel
Wealth channel is parallel to the Tobin’s q theory because it also focuses on
the impact of equity prices on real economy. Modigliani (1971) raised the
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question of wealth effect on monetary transmission mechanism as follows:
M ↓=⇒ Pe ↓=⇒ wealth ↓=⇒ C ↓=⇒ Y ↓ (2.4)
Wealth channel argues that consumption level of people is determined by
the ”lifetime resources”, which is made up of human capital, real capital and
financial wealth. As it is discussed in the Tobin’s q theory, contradictionary
monetary policy yields equity prices to fall. Such a decline shrinks the current
wealth level since a major component of financial wealth is common stocks.
To compensate, consumers lower their consumption expenditures and hence,
aggregate output decreases. (Mishkin, 1995: 6-7)
Meltzer (1995) extends the impact of monetary policy on wealth level with
land and property values which is supported by Japanese experience in the
1980s and 1990s. Meltzer suggests that contractionary monetary policy can
lead a decrease in land and property values, which causes wealth of consumer
to decrease. Thereby consumption and aggregate output decline. Accord-
ingly, Pe in schematic view in wealth channel and Tobin’s q theory equally
applies to residential housings.
2.2 Credit View
Previous channels discussed are referred to as ”money view” since monetary
policy impact is mainly based on the interest rate and asset price effects.
Limiting monetary transmission mechanism with the interest rate effects led
researchers to make alternative explanations based on the asymmetric infor-
mation in financial markets. Credit view proposes two channels for monetary
transmission mechanism that are influenced by the information problems.
One of the channels operates through the effects of balance sheets and in-
come statements of businesses and households, including net worth, cash flow
and liquid assets - in some sources it is referred to as “broad credit channel”.
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Section 2.2.1 discusses different channels of balance sheet effects. Other credit
channel operates through bank lending and it is refereed as “narrow credit
channel” and it is the main interest of the thesis. Section 2.2.2 reviews bank
lending channel literature.
2.2.1 Broad Credit Channel
Balance Sheet Channel
Balance sheet channel works through the net worth of firms. Contractionary
monetary policy causes equity prices to decrease (as explained in Section
2.1.3). Hence net worth and creditworthiness of the firms fall. With lower
net worth, lenders have less collateral for their loans; therefore firms face dif-
ficulties in borrowing due to increased adverse selection problems. Parallel to
adverse selection, moral hazard problems also increase since firms have higher
incentive to choose risky projects since their equity stakes shrink. When ad-
verse selection and moral hazard problems arise, likelihood of banks to have
higher amounts of nonperforming loans also increases. Therefore, lending de-
creases which leads investment to decrease. Hence aggregate output declines.
M ↓=⇒ Pe ↓=⇒ adverse selection ↑=⇒
moral hazard ↑=⇒ lending ↓=⇒ I ↓=⇒ Y ↓ (2.5)
Kuttner and Mosser (2002:17) discuss balance sheet channel as ”financial
accelerator” effect (referred to Bernanke et. al., 1999 study) :
In “frictionless” credit markets, a fall in the value of borrow-
ers’ collateral will not affect investment decisions; but in the pres-
ence of information or agency costs, declining collateral values
will increase the premium borrowers must pay for external finance,
which in turn will reduce consumption and investment. Thus, the
impact of policy-induced changes in interest rates may be magni-
fied through this “financial accelerator” effect.
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Financial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999) also provides basis
for cash flow channel which is discussed in the next section.
Cash Flow Channel
Since a rise in the interest rates causes interest expenses of the borrower
to increase, which causes productivity, and in turn output to decrease and
firm’s cash flow to decline. Lower cash flow increases the dependence of firms
to external funds because of a decrease in internal finance strength. This
increases the expected agency costs (adverse selection problems) and moral
hazard problems. Therefore the premium1 that must be paid by the firms for
external funds increases. Thereby lending decreases as explained in “financial
accelerator model” and in turn investment and aggregate output decrease.
M ↓=⇒ i ↑=⇒ cash flow ↓=⇒ adverse selection ↑=⇒
moral hazard ↑=⇒ lending ↓=⇒ I ↓=⇒ Y ↓ (2.6)
Although most of the studies investigate this direct effect of monetary
policy changes on cash flow, Bernanke and Gertler (1995: 36) underlines
a plausible indirect effect of contractionary monetary policy on cash flow
of firms. Since a tight monetary policy influences consumer spending (due
to cost-of-capital or balance sheet reasons) in a negative way, revenues and
profits of firms decrease. But since there are fixed costs including wage and
interest payments, there appears a financial gap. Thereby the net worth
and creditworthiness of firms decrease and cause to investment spending to
decrease.
1External Finance Premium defined by Age´nor (2004) as: The wedge between the cost
of funds raised externally (the bank lending rate for most firms in developing countries)
and the opportunity cost of internal funds (or retained earnings) which could be an interest
rate on government bonds, the bank deposit rate, or the foreign rate of interest.” (page
138)
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Household Liquidity Effects
In liquidity-effects view, unwillingness of consumer to spend is influential on
the aggregate output:
M ↓ =⇒ Pe ↓=⇒ financial assets ↓=⇒ likelihood of financial distress ↑
=⇒ consumer durable and housing expenditure ↓=⇒ Y ↓ (2.7)
In this model, decreased value of equity prices due to a contractionary mon-
etary policy yields the value of financial assets to fall. This situation causes
consumers to expect financial distress since they feel insecure. The expec-
tation of financial distress leads consumers to hold liquid assets because in
financial distress periods, their illiquid assets will be sold with large losses and
it is irrational to invest on illiquid assets. Hence consumption on durables
and housing expenditures fall. Aggregate output declines since consumption
declines. This effect has been found to be the important factor during the
Great Depression period (Mishkin, 1978). The main difference between liquid
and cash-flow views is that it is not the lenders who are unwilling to lend to
consumers but the consumers who are unwilling to spend.
Unanticipated Price Level Channel
Mishkin (2006) underlines the third balance sheet channel that can be ob-
served in industrialized economies which operates through general price level.
An unanticipated decline in the price level due to monetary tightening may
be influential on the net worth of the firm. Since debt payments are con-
tractually fixed in nominal terms in industrialized countries, unanticipated
decline in price leads real value of debt to rise, but the real value of assets
15
remain unchanged.
M ↓ =⇒ unanticipated P ↓=⇒ adverse selection ↑=⇒ moral hazard ↑
=⇒ lending ↓=⇒ I ↓=⇒ Y ↓ (2.8)
Hence, net worth of the company decreases which causes moral hazard and
adverse selection problems to arise.
2.2.2 Narrow Credit Channel - Bank Lending Channel
The idea of bank lending channel originates from the significant role of banks
in the financial system. Since banks specialize in overcoming informational
problems and other frictions in credit markets, they are the principal source of
external finance in many countries. This dominance is more obvious especially
for small and medium-sized borrowers, because their access to stock market
is generally limited. Following a monetary tightening, banks’ ability to offer
lending may decline due to a decline in bank reserves:
M ↓=⇒ bank reserves ↓=⇒ bank loans ↓=⇒ I ↓=⇒ Y ↓ (2.9)
Decline in bank reserves may result from the restrictions on banks’ external
funding as explained in broad credit channel section 2.2.1. A contractionary
monetary policy may reduce the net value and/or cash flow of the banks,
hence external financing may become as challenging for banks as for any
firm. This may restrict banks’ ability to offer loans, and cause a shift in loan
supply - this phenomenon is also referred to as “credit crunch”. As bank
loans decrease, investment of bank-loan-dependent firms will also decline (as
the external funding premium increases) and in turn aggregate output will
decline.
For highly credit-worthy borrowers, including large firms, it may be possi-
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ble to substitute bank loans with other means of external financing since their
access to credit markets is easier. But for small borrowers and individuals
this shift may not be an alternative.
In bank lending channel view, a three-asset world is assumed, which aims
to explain circumstances that cannot be captured by the classical money
view’s two-asset world. Three assets of the view are money, bonds and bank
loans. Kashyap and Stein’s (1994: 2) observation on these assets are that
they are different from each other and they need to be accounted for sepa-
rately when analyzing the impact of monetary policy shocks. Hence, perfect
substitution assumption is abandoned in bank lending view.
Criticisms on Bank Lending View
There are two necessary conditions that must hold for bank lending channel to
be present distinctively and they are exposed to critiques. The first condition
is as follows:
Spending or investment of some households or firms depends on
bank loans.
Meltzer’s (1995: 65) criticism mainly on the word “depends”. Since it is
agreed on the importance of banks on external financing for small firms, this
proposition is doubtful if “depends” means “the only source of financing”.
In that case, it should be remembered that there may be alternative lenders
including credit cards, finance companies, trade credit, venture capitalists,
families and others. Therefore Meltzer (1995:65) suggests using the word
“depends” in the meaning of “the principal source of external funds”. A
detailed discussion on “bank-dependence” and “intermediary-dependence” in
Kashyap and Stein (1994) is also criticize the first necessary condition and
reach a similar result to Meltzer (1995).
The second condition is as follows:
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Monetary policy shifts the banks’ supply of loans relative to the
other types of credit.
Critics of this condition raise the question “Why do banks prefer to reduce
loans more than proportionally to their loss of reserves but not to borrow or
sell securities to compensate?”. Bank lending view explains this shift with the
reduced net worth of banks and disproportionate effects on small borrowers
(Broad credit channel effects). But this explanation is found to be shallow
since the effect of monetary policy changes on banks’ net worth is generally
small. Critics argue that banks compensate losses with the gains from private
agents. For example, Romer and Romer (1990) points out that to the extent
that there exist substitutes in bank portfolios for reservable deposits such
as certificate of deposits (CDs), this specific channel could be weak to non-
existent.Therefore this proposition is doubtful for some researchers.
The Role of Bank Characteristics
Critiques on Proposition 2 lead bank lending literature to focus on cross-
sectional differences between banks with the intention of discriminating
among loan supply and loan demand movements. Gambacorta (2004: 1740)
explains this strategy with:
... the hypothesis that certain bank-specific characteristics (for
example size, liquidity, capitalization) influence only loan supply
movements while bank’s loan demand is independent of these char-
acteristics. Broadly speaking, this approach assumes that after a
monetary tightening the drop in the availability of total deposits
(which affects banks’ availability to make new loans) or the ability
to shield loan portfolio is different among banks.
This relatively new approach claims that small and less capitalized banks
face higher costs in raising “non-secured” deposits since they suffer from
higher degree of informational frictions in financial markets. Therefore they
are obliged to reduce lending more. Likewise, illiquid banks are argued to
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be exposed to stronger impacts of contractionary monetary policy on lending
because of drawing down cash and securities. Hence it is expected that these
banks are more sensitive to monetary policy changes. Age´nor (2004: 121) in-
terprets this aspect in general: “... weaknesses in the banking system distort
the transmission process of monetary policy because banks that are less able
to control their balance sheets will be less responsive to changes in interest
rates...” The characteristics of banks which increase their sensitivities to the
monetary policy changes are one of the main interests of current bank lending
literature.
This literature is different from the studies investigating the macroeco-
nomic impact of bank lending channel on loans. Instead, it “claims the exis-
tence of such channel upon the fact that a different response of lending supply
among banks is detected” (Gambacorta, 2004: 1740).
Next section summarizes empirical studies of the literature and focuses on
bank characteristics that are included as independent variables in the models.
2.3 Empirical Evidence On Bank Lending
Channel
The model proposed by Bernanke and Blinder in 1988 was the pioneer study
that proposes an alternative model to classical IS/LM model. In Bernanke
and Blinder’s model, IS curve replaced with CC curve (stands for commodi-
ties and credits. The CC/LM model led many researchers to inquire evidence
on bank lending channel. To this end, alternative models proposed (including
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap et. al. (1993)) and the existence of
this channel, initially, has been searched for US economy. Time-series rela-
tionships were estimated in most of the studies to distinguish shifts either by
loan demand or loan supply. However, there are problems in distinguishing
these shifts and explaining long-term responses of loan supply to monetary
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tightening. Consequently, researchers have begun to focus on bank character-
istics for individual effects of bank lending (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Kishan
and Opiela, 2000).
There are vast about of empirical studies in this literature for several
countries (see some of these in Table 1).2 These evidence are chosen to
emphasize several bank characteristics used in the literature. The common
dependent variable of the chosen studies is annual loan growth.3 As seen
in Table 1, there is negative impact of monetary policy indicator on lending
growth. Monetary policy (MP) indicators are generally short-term interest
rates in most of the studies. However, there are also some studies especially in
US, that use different measures such as Romer dates as in (Romer and Romer,
1989), Boschen-Mills index as in Boschen-Mills (1995), measures developed
by Bernanke and Mihov (1998) by Strongin (1995).
Besides monetary policy, other economic indicators such as GDP growth,
inflation rate were included in the models to control the macroeconomic
impacts on bank lending. Three most common bank specific variables are
size, liquidity and capitalization. Although there are alternative balance-
sheet items as shown in Table 1, these three bank characteristics are common
in almost all studies. Securitization and multibank holding company affilia-
tions were tested in recent studies of Altunbas (2009) and Ashcraft (2006),
respectively.
There is a segment of literature that adopted the two-stage empirical strat-
egy which is first introduced by Kashyap and Stein in 2000 and followed by
Campello (2002) and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008). This two-stage strat-
egy is different from most of the studies in the literature that combine bank
level data and aggregate data to estimate at one stage. It links annual loan
growth with monetary policy shocks indirectly. The first step of the strat-
2See Kashyap and Stein (1997) and Bean, Larsen, Nikolov (2002) for a brief surveys.
3 Only in Brissimis and Delis (2008), the dependent variable is spread between lending
rate and bond rate.
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egy is to cross-sectionally test data and to obtain estimates for sensitivities
on particular bank characteristic. This characteristic is considered to be in-
fluential on bank’s reaction to monetary tightening. In other words, it is
expected that monetary tightening will affect the sensitivity (or dependence)
of banks to that characteristic (for example liquidity) and in turn their in-
ternal funds will be affected. This will also cause loan growth of banks to
change. Due to the fact that the regression coefficients (sensitivities) obtained
from the first step generate time-series data, they are included in a second
stage (time-series) regression. The second stage regression searches for a re-
lationship between banks’ sensitivities and monetary policy shocks and other
macroeconomic indicators.
Kashyap and Stein (2000) used two-step strategy to identify a bank lend-
ing channel in US economy during the period of 1976-1993. They found
evidence on bank lending channel and emphasized that “...Within the class
of small banks, changes in monetary policy matter more for the lending of
those banks with the least liquid balance sheets.” Following them, Campello
(2002) focused on income-sensitivity of loan growth especially for small banks.
More precisely, he categorized small banks which act alone and which affiliate
with a global bank and showed that the impact of monetary policy shocks is
stronger on stand-alone small banks than on affiliated small banks. Therefore
the dependence (sensitivity) of stand-alone banks to their own cash-flow is
higher when there is a monetary tightening.
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) also adopted Kashyap and Stein’s identi-
fication strategy to test the influence of globalization on the transmission of
monetary policy. Their main variable for the first stage is liquidity. Their
results suggest that banks with higher global access to external funds are
less dependent to liquidity when there is monetary tightening since they have
a unique ability to activate their internal sources using their foreign offices.
Whereas, banks with less global connections are more dependent on liquidity
23
when there is a monetary policy shock.
In this thesis, the studies by Kashyap and Stein (2000), Campello (2002)
and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) are taken as a roadmap and their method-
ologies are adopted to Turkish data to understand the sensitivity of Turkish
commercial banks on monetary shock during the period 1998:Q1-2009:Q1.
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CHAPTER 3
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN TURKISH BANKING
SECTOR AND
REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT
Following the crises in 2001 and the restructuring process, Turkish banking
sector showed a rapid growth performance in 1998- 2009 period. The total
assets raised from USD 45 million USD to 464 billion billion USD, their ratio
to GDP from 57 percent to 81 percent. The share of loans in total asset
increased from 38.0 percent in 19981 to 54.0 percent in 2008, and loans to
GDP ratio increased from 9.4 percent to 40.1 percent (see Figure 3.1). The
financial sector is still at the stage of growth. It is small and shallow when
compared with the financial sectors of developed countries.
In the banking sector, there are 45 banks at September 30, 2009. The
system underwent substantial consolidation in the past ten years, shrinking
down from 80 banks at September 30, 2000. This drop was mainly due
to the failure and the transfer of about 20 banks to the Savings Deposit
Insurance Fund (SDIF), but also some mergers in recent years. As seen in
Table 3.1, the number of banks declined to 61 as of December 31, 2001. The
1In 2001, due to financial crisis, total loans to total asset decreased to 26.5 percent.
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Figure 3.1: Financial Depth (1998-2009 period)

15.8% 15.5% 15.8%
13.6%
9.4%
11.0%
14.0%
18.7%
22.5%
25.9%
28.3%
40.1%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
26
Table 3.1: Number of Banks in 1998, 2001 and 2009
1998 2001 2009
Number Number Number
Banks Branches Banks Branches Banks Branches
Deposit Bank 60 7340 46 6889 45 8991
State-owned 4 2832 3 2725 2 2530
Private 38 4393 22 3523 11 4390
SDIF - - 6 408 1 1
Foreign 18 115 15 233 17 2070
Non-depository
Banks 15 30 15 19 13 45
State-owned 3 12 3 4 3 19
Private 9 14 9 12 6 12
Foreign 3 4 3 3 4 14
Total 75 7370 61 6908 45 8790
Source: TBA. SDIF stands for banks in the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund.
bank failures and the transfer of these failed banks to SDIF were mostly
between the periods of December 1999 to November 2001.2 Nevertheless, the
system was considered to be overbanked even in 2001 and the total number
of banks declined to 45 as of 2009 (32 out of the current 45 banks are deposit
banks). There has been no regional bank in Turkey since 1980s and hence,
all banks conduct their banking activities through nation-wide branches. As
also seen in Table 3.1, over the period of 1998-2009, the total number of
branches increased significantly especially for private banks (domestic and
foreign private banks). Recent acquisitions of small-scaled domestic private
banks by foreign banks increased the number of branches of the foreign banks.
In terms of funding and liquidity structure of the Turkish banks, the
numbers are more stable. Total deposits rose from 77 million USD in 1998 to
298 billion USD in 2008. Total deposits to total assets ratio declined from 66.0
percent in 1998 to 64.0 percent in 2008. The liquidity of the Turkish banking
sector is considered to be satisfactory. As compared to developed countries,
this ratio is quite high since customer deposits have historically been the
most important funding source of Turkish banks. Yet, the introduction of
several other new financial instruments such as mutual funds, pension funds,
2See Saving Deposit Insurance Fund Annual Report, 2000 from www.tmsf.org.tr.
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stabilized this ratio to be around 60 percent over time. During the period
1998-2009, the liquid asset to total asset ratio was also steadily: 32.0 percent
in 1998 to 30.2 percent in 2008. To test the existence of monetary transmission
in Turkey, the level of liquidity and deposit funding of banks are two main
balance sheet items that would be used.
Financial sector reform began with the establishment of the Banking Reg-
ulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) in August 2000. Members of staff
from the banking supervision departments at the treasury and the Central
Bank were transferred to the BRSA, including staff of the SDIF, which be-
came a legal entity administered by the BRSA. The BRSA is in charge of the
regulation and supervision of the banking sector. It is an independent body
established by the Banks Act and came into force in June 1999.
The mission of the agency is “...to provide confidence and stability in
the financial markets, .... to ensure active operating of the credit system...”3
Steinherr et. al. (2004) discuss the role of BRSA in rehabilitating banking
system after crisis extensively . In May 2001, BRSA formulated and executed
a rehabilitation program in consultation with IMF and World Bank and took
a four-prong approach:
• restructuring state-owned banks,
• resolving banks taken over by the Savings and Deposits Insurance Fund,
• strengthening the financial structure of private banks,
• improving the regulatory and supervisory framework.
Steinherr et al. (2004) argue that state banks were restructured in the
early phases of the program, however rest of the rehabilitation were relatively
slow. In addition to the financial and operational restructuring of these banks,
all adopted legislative amendments promoted efficiency and competition in
3Source: http://www.bddk.org.tr/WebSitesi/english/
About Us/About BRSA/5804BRSA Info Booklet 31 07 2009.pdf
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the whole banking sector. Following sound banking practices established
confidence in the sector. Thus, lending activities of the Turkish banks in this
new closely regulated environment grew steadily.
Government intervention takes important role in monetary transmission
mechanism (Age´nor, 2004; Kamin et al., 1998). It has been argued that
besides the direct intervention of monetary authorities (government or central
bank), regulations and supervisions exert influence on financial system. There
are evidence of prudential regulations in emerging market economies including
India, Hong Kong, and Argentina that is discussed in detail by Kamin et. al.
(1998). These regulations have incentive or disincentive role in the conduct
of monetary policy and there are objections and appreciations for regulations
in the context of the economic situation.
Especially after financial crisis in 2000-2001, the measures taken by the
Central Bank and BRSA against the increase in domestic and global finan-
cial risks have helped the banking sector to maintain healthy functioning in
Turkey. More precisely, the main structure and the duties of the Central
Bank have been altered considerably through a series of legal arrangements
effected as of April 2001. By virtue of an amendment introduced to the Law,
the Central Bank is rendered independent with regard to the use of monetary
tools such as overnight rates. In this thesis, it is aimed to understand whether
Turkish banks are sensitive or less sensitive to monetary policy changes during
the period of stable monetary policy and stable banking operations
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
4.1 Data
In the econometric analysis of this thesis, quarterly data are used for the
period 1998:Q1-2009:Q1. The beginning period is selected according to the
availability of quarterly banking data by Turkish Banking Association. More-
over, this period covers the whole new era with new regulatory agency in
Turkey.
As explained in Section 3, several bank characteristics play a significant
role on the transmission of monetary policy on bank lending. These bank level
data are obtained from Statistical Reports provided by The Banks Association
of Turkey (www.tbb.org.tr). As of December 2009, 32 deposit banks are
reported to be active in the financial system. Total number of bank branches
is 8,991 with total of 167,064 employees. Among these 32 deposit banks, 20
of these banks are selected for analysis.1 These banks constitute 95.52% of
the total banking assets, 95.18% of the loans provided and 99.10% of the
total deposits collected. There are also non-deposit banks in Turkey known
as investment and development banks and participation banks. In addition
to their small share in banking, these banks are excluded in the analysis since
their funding structure is different than deposit banks.
1Although it is not currently active, balance sheet items of Koc Bank for period 1998Q1-
2006Q2 are included in the data set. Koc Bank has merged with Yapi Kredi Bankasi in
the third quarter of 2006.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Balance Sheet Items of 20 Banks
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Total Loans (US million) 4,215.82 6,595.53 13.47 37,751.08 890
Liquid Assets (US million) 4,527.57 7,817.85 13.20 50,567.94 890
Total Assets (US million) 10,312.34 14,626.52 38.83 74,974.12 890
Liquid Assets/Total Assets 0.41 0.15 0.05 1.00 890
Capital Ratio (%) 0.12 0.06 -0.03 0.95 890
Net Income/Total Loans 0.05 0.13 -1.54 1.44 890
Summary statistics for balance sheet items of banks chosen are presented
in Table 4.1. Bank size, liquidity and capitalization are the three most com-
mon bank characteristics in bank lending channel.2 On average, banks in the
sample hold 41 percent of their portfolio as liquid assets. Their capital-to-
assets is 12 percent and cash flow proxied by net income-to-total loans is 5
percent.
As mentioned in Section 2, size is another important characteristic of
banks that may influence the impact of monetary shocks on bank lending.
More precisely, the impact of monetary policy shock is different among small
and large banks. In the empirical analysis, seven banks are selected as large
banks according to their total assets where three of them are state-owned
banks. These seven banks are determined arbitrarily, since there is an obvious
difference between top seven banks and the rest of the banks in terms of their
total assets.3 Remaining thirteen banks are categorized as small banks. As
seen in Table 4.2, capitalization, liquidity and cash flows for small and large
banks are, on average, similar characteristics as in the full sample.
Not only the bank level data but macroeconomic data are also used in
the empirical study. To this end, nominal GDP growth rates are collected
from Turkish Statistical Institute. The monetary policy indicator is quarterly
nominal overnight rates that are announced by Central Bank of Republic of
Turkey. Alternative measures of monetary policy indicator do not exist in
2The description of the the bank characteristics is included in Data Appendix.
3For example, the “smallest” bank among large banks group is Halkbank and its total
asset size is 51,096 million TL whereas the “biggest” bank of the small banks group (Fi-
nansbank) has a size of 26,573 million TL. (As of December 2008 - source: www.tbb.org.tr)
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Large and Small Banks
Large Banks: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Total Loans (US million) 8,982.32 8,833.73 671 37,751 314
Liquid Assets (US million) 10,775.77 10,343.65 578 50,568 314
Total Assets (US million) 23,615.46 17,571.87 4,041 74,974 314
Liquid Assets/Total Assets 0.42 0.16 0.05 0.79 314
Capital Ratio (%) 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.25 314
Net Income/Total Loans 0.05 0.12 -0.77 0.88 314
Small Banks: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Total Loans (US million) 1,604.60 2,321.05 13.47 14,078 576
Liquid Assets (US million) 1,006.67 978.29 13.20 6,562 576
Total Assets (US million) 3,024.54 3,479.25 38.83 19,958 576
Liquid Assets/Total Assets 0.41 0.15 0.09 1.00 576
Capital Ratio (%) 0.13 0.06 -0.03 0.95 576
Net Income/Total Loans 0.05 0.13 -1.54 1.44 576
Turkey for the time period studied in this thesis. Overnight rate is the most
common variable used since it is controlled by monetary authority (Central
Bank) in most of the countries. There are also supportive comments on
overnight rate as a monetary policy indicator. For example, Age´nor (2004:
131) constructs a base to his arguments with the following sentence: “The
discussion throughout focuses on the case of a country ..... where the opera-
tional target for monetary policy is an overnight interest rate, which the
central bank controls by affecting commercial banks’ liquid reserves through
repurchase and reserve repurchase agreements...”
Hence, overnight rate is used in the time-series regression of this thesis.
Figure 4.1 presents the quarterly graph of overnight rate. There is a sharp
peak in the financial crisis period (2000:Q3-200:Q1), but except for that pe-
riod, figures are steadily declining over the 10% - 30% interval. A relatively
small fluctuation can be observed in 2006:Q3 which is an outcome of the
Monetary Policy Meeting in June 2006 (see Figure 4.2 for closer look at this
peak). Researchers on Turkish inflation place emphasis on this meeting, in-
cluding Basci et. al. (2008) and Brooks (2007). Therefore an additional test
will be conducted to analyze the influence of this meeting, as explained in the
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next section.
4.2 Methodology
The empirical model is based on Kashyap and Stein (2000)’s two-step strat-
egy. This model was then utilized and refined by Campello (2002). The strat-
egy includes estimation of cross-sectional sensitivities of loan growth to bank
specific variables at each quarter in the first step. Therefore, cross-sectional
regressions for each quarter are conducted separately for banks indexed by
i. In this step, there is a variable of interest among independent variables.
In this way, research focuses on the sensitivity of loan growth to one specific
bank characteristic. For Campello’s study, income from operations (or cash
flow) is the characteristic of interest. Another study that follows Kashyap and
Stein and Campello is the paper by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008). Different
from Campello, in this research the characteristic of interest is the liquidity of
banks. More precisely, global banks that may have fewer problems in terms
of liquidity, argued to be less sensitivity to monetary shocks.
The purpose of the first regression is to collect the coefficient estimates
of the chosen variable for each quarter and then regress them in the second
step. Second step is dealing with monetary shocks; therefore it is a time-
series regression. Similar to Campello (2002) and Cetorelli and Goldberg
(2008), the lagged values of monetary policy indicator and lagged value of
GDP growth will be the two main variables in the second-stage. Following
subsection includes alternative models for the first step.
4.2.1 Step 1
Alternative Model 1
The first alternative model is similar to Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) in
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Figure 4.1: Overnight Rate in Turkey (1998-2009 period)
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Figure 4.2: Closer look: Impact of 2006:Q3 Monetary Policy Meeting on
Overnight Rates
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which the cross-sectional model is regressed at each quarter in following form:
∆ log(Loans)i,t = αt + γt∆ log(Loans)i,t−1 + β1,tL/Ai,t−1 + λtLog(A)i,t−1
+ µtK/Ai,t−1 + εi,t. (4.1)
Change of annual loan growth, ∆ log(Loans)i,t, is regressed on the first lag
of change of annual loan growth in order to capture bank-specific growth
opportunities.
L/Ai,t−1 denotes the ratio of liquid assets to total assets and it is first-
degree lagged variable. This variable is the main variable of interest following
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008). More precisely, it is assumed that bank lend-
ing sensitivity to monetary shock depends on the availability of liquidity of
a bank. Thus, the estimated beta coefficient of liquidity variable (β1)
4 will
be included in the second step estimation to understand the sensitivity of
monetary shock on annual loan growth of a bank.
K/Ai,t−1 is the capitalization ratio and measures the degree of capitaliza-
tion of the bank. Log(A)i,t−1 is logarithms of total assets (A) of bank i. Both
capitalization ratio and size characteristics are used in first lag. In the papers
by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) and Campello, four lags of loan growth were
studied. However, due to the scarcity of time series data, the lags are limited
with only the first lag and thus, excessive loss of observations are aimed to
be prevented in this study.
Alternative Model 2
Following model is a modified version of Campello (2002):
∆ log(Loans)i,t = αt + γt∆ log(Loans)i,t−1 + β2,tIi,t−1 + λtLog(A)i,t−1
+ µtK/Ai,t−1 + εi,t. (4.2)
4Subscript is used to differentiate among alternative models and their beta estimates.
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Main difference between first and the second alternative is the variable of
interest that is changed from liquidity of banks, L/Ai,t−1, to net income-to-
total loan ratio, Ii,t−1, of a bank. This ratio is used as a proxy for cash flow
of banks. Campello (2002) argued that the income coefficient will capture
the extent to which frictions in the market for uninsured deposits create a
wedge between a small banks cost of internal and external funds. Hence, this
coefficient measures the sensitivity of loan growth to income from banking
operations. For similar reasons discussed in the first alternative, lags of loan
growth are reduced, only the first lag considered.
Alternative Model 3
Third alternative is aiming to give an insight about the relationship be-
tween loan growth and the type of ownership of the bank. To this end, a
dummy variable is added to (4.1):
∆ log(Loans)i,t = αt + γt∆ log(Loans)i,t−1 + β3,tL/Ai,t−1 + λtLog(A)i,t−1
+µtK/Ai,t−1 + ωtGDi + εi,t. (4.3)
The dummy variable GDi categorizes banks that are owned by the gov-
ernment. The aim of this variable is to test the influence of ownership on loan
growth in Turkey. Since government-owned banks can be argued to have no or
less limitation on the availability of liquid funds, the impact of any financial,
monetary and real shock on lending behavior of government banks will be
different than private banks. Hence, these banks’ loan growth are controlled
by using a dummy variable.
Alternative Model 4
The biggest pitfall of this two step strategy (as argued by Kashyap and
Stein, 2000: 415) is the potential biases in the level of β coefficients. The
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main reason for a bias may be the multicollinearity of right hand side vari-
ables. Since all independent variables are related to total assets, there is likely
to have multicollinearity in the model. Kashyap and Stein (2000) conduct ro-
bustness tests, to consider the problems related to the two-stage approach.5
However, they also mention that the main point in the two-stage approach
is the correlation of betas (sensitivities) with monetary policy indicator. Al-
ternative model 5 will be conducted to overcome or reduce the influence of
multicollinearity by reducing the number of independent variables:
∆ log(Loans)i,t = αt + γt∆ log(Loans)i,t−1 + β4,tL/Ai,t−1 + εi,t. (4.4)
The loan growth is regressed on its first lag and liquidity proxy only to
reduce the impact of multicollinearity on the results.
Alternative Model 5
The bank size is found to be influential on banks’ responses to monetary
policy shocks (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). To test whether this mechanism is
valid for Turkey, the following empirical model is used:
∆ log(Loans)i,t = αt + γt∆ log(Loans)i,t−1 + β5,tL/Ai,t−1 + β6,tL/A · SDi
+λtLog(A)i,t−1 + µtK/Ai,t−1 + εi,t (4.5)
where SD is the size dummy and L/A ·SDi is the interaction variable. Since
there is limited number of observations left when small and large banks are
separately tested, the problem regarding degrees of freedom in the estimation
may create first-step estimates to be doubtful. Hence, size dummy is used to
handle this problem. For large banks SD = 1, and the liquidity sensitivity
of large banks are estimated as β5,t+ β6,t. For small banks β5,t is liquidity
sensitivity estimate.
5Robustness tests of Kashyap and Stein is modified and applied to our data set as well.
These results are reported in the following chapter.
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Alternative Model 6
Final alternative model for the first step regression is related to foreign
banks. In an emerging country, foreign banks are typically large global banks
that have less concern on liquidity problem (Ceterolli and Golberg, 2008).
In order to control their effect on liquidity-sensitivity, the following empirical
model is used:
∆ log(Loans)i,t = αt + γt∆ log(Loans)i,t−1 + β7,tL/Ai,t−1 + λtLog(A)i,t−1
+µtK/Ai,t−1 + ωtFi + εi,t. (4.6)
where Fi is foreign-owned bank dummy. This model is aimed to control the
lending behavior of foreign banks in Turkey.
4.2.2 Step 2
In the second stage, βt coefficients from alternative models are regressed on
the following equation:
βj,t = φ+ ϕMPt−1 + κGDPt−1 + θBRSA+ υt, j = 1, 2, . . . , 6 (4.7)
where MPt−1 is monetary policy indicator. In this study, quarterly overnight
rate6 reported by Central Bank of Turkey is used as a monetary policy in-
dicator. In the second-stage regression, first lag of GDP growth, GDPt−1
and BRSA dummy variable are controlled for to understand the sensitivity
of loan growth. The establishment of Banking Regulation and Supervision
Agency (BRSA ) of Turkey changed the regulatory environment of the banks
in Turkey hence its impact have to be controlled to understand the impact
of monetary shocks on bank lending.
6which are determined daily.
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Addition to Second Stage Regression
As presented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, overnight rates changed over the
period of 1998:Q1-2009:Q1. Besides the huge peak in financial crisis period,
a relatively narrow peak is observed in the third quarter of 2006. In order
to capture these rises in overnight rates, a dummy variable is added to the
second stage:
βj,t = φ+ ϕMPt−1 + κGDPt−1 + θBRSA+ ηMPC + υt, j = 1, 2, . . . , 6.
(4.8)
where MPC stands for the dummy of Monetary Policy Meeting which caused
overnight rates to rise. This second stage model will only be used for Alter-
native Model 1 described on 4.2.1. This alternative model aims to deepen the
empirical analysis in Turkish economical context.
4.2.3 Tests Regarding Heteroscedasticity and Autocor-
relation of Error Terms
The second-stage-regression residuals (υ) are tested in terms of heteroscedas-
ticity and autocorrelation (HAC). The test conducted for the error terms is
“coefficient t-test” available on R statistical software, which is the software
used for the model analyses of this thesis. The second stage regressions are
reported with Newey and West Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation con-
sistent (HAC) covariance matrix estimators (1987).
4.2.4 Hypotheses of Econometric Models
In the first step regression, loan growth sensitivities to different bank charac-
teristics is the main interest. Table 4.3 summarizes these sensitivities denoted
as β coefficients.
39
Table 4.3: Definitions for Sensitivities
β1 Liquidity-sensitivity of loan growth
β2 Cash-flow-sensitivity loan growth
β3 Liquidity-sensitivity of loan growth
with government control dummy
β4 Liquidity-sensitivity of loan growth with
two independent variables (for multicollinearity)
β5 Liquidity-sensitivity of loan growth
for small banks in single model
β5 + β6 Liquidity-sensitivity of loan growth
for large banks in single model
β7 Liquidity-sensitivity of loan growth
with foreign affiliation control dummy
Time-series regressions conducted in the second step try to link different
loan growth sensitivities to monetary shocks: changes in the overnight interest
rates. In this section, the whole set of hypotheses is discussed in details.
The first alternative model tests the impact of monetary policy shocks to
liquidity-sensitivity of loan growth. Following the evidence of Kashyap and
Stein (2000), the expectation from this model is to observe a positive coeffi-
cient for monetary policy indicator. More precisely, an increase (a decrease)
in the short-term interest rates will increase (decrease) liquidity-sensitivity
of loan growth. Or, the liquidity-sensitivity of banks increases in monetary
tightening. A shock that causes available funds for banks to contract is ex-
pected to lower the rate of growth of loan supply for banks that have less
liquid asset in their assets. In this model, all banks in the sample are con-
sidered to search evidence on the link between liquidity-sensitivity of loan
growth and overnight rates.
The second alternative model is a modified version of Campello (2002) in
which the main focus is “income-sensitivity of loan growth”. This model is to
understand whether there exists another monetary transmission mechanism
using Turkish data. The association between monetary shock and loan growth
sensitivity is expected to be similar to the first model: A positive coefficient
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for monetary policy (MP) indicator in the second regression. If there exists
a significant and positive relationship between income-sensitivity and MP
indicator, then this will lead to conclude that loan provisions by Turkish banks
are significantly dependent (sensitive) to their cash-flows (internal funds).
This result will confirm the findings by Campello (2002) and Kashyap and
Stein (2000).
The third alternative model is a slightly different version of the first model
since it includes a control variable for state-owned banks. The expected rela-
tion between MP and loan growth sensitivity is similar with the expectation of
first model since it tests almost the same relationship. Since the loan growths
of state-owned banks are controlled, private banks with liquidity constraint
would be affected at a higher amount by monetary shock.
The fourth model is constructed for reducing the possible problem of multi-
collinearity. The liquid asset-to-asset and capital-to-asset ratio and logarithm
of total assets might be highly correlated. Hence, the first-stage regressions
are constrained such that there are only two independent variables (lag of
loan growth and liquidity) are used. Since the first-stage estimations are more
consistent, the sensitivity results in the second stage would be less doubtful.
The fifth alternative model provides a comparison between small and large
banks in terms of the relationship between their loan growth sensitivities to
liquidity and monetary policy changes. In the literature, the empirical evi-
dence suggest that small bank’s sensitivity to interest rate changes are higher
than that of large banks. Especially, we will be able to test whether findings
by Kashyap and Stein’s (2000) are valid for Turkish banks in periods of mon-
etary tightening. More precisely, the expectation is to find significant and
positive relationship between liquidity-sensitivity and loan growth for small
banks and less significant or insignificant results for large banks. The impact
of monetary policy shocks on small banks’ liquidity-sensitivity is expected
to be higher since their access to external funds is limited relative to large
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banks. In this model an interaction variable is used and problem of degrees
of freedom is tried to be eliminated. Three government owned banks are in-
cluded in the large banks; however their portfolio selections may significantly
differ from that of private banks. Therefore an additional test is conducted by
removing government-owned banks from the data. With remaining seventeen
banks, this model is repeated (see findings in the Appendix).
The sixth model is controlling foreign affiliations of the existence banks
in Turkey. A dummy variable is included in equation 4.1 to control for these
banks. This model is similar to third model in the sense that these banks
might be less sensitive to liquidity shocks due to monetary shocks. Hence,
similar to the third model with the government control dummy, it is expected
that after controlling for foreign banks, the sensitivity of the other domestic
banks might be higher to monetary policy changes in the second step.
The alternative model for the second stage regressions is mentioned in
equation 4.8. This model is similar to previous studies in US that uses sev-
eral periods such as Romer dates that monetary tightening is unexpected
(see for example, Kashyap et al., 1993; Oliner and Rudebusch,1996; Mor-
gan, 1998). Over the period of 1998:Q1-2009:Q1, the ordinary meeting of the
Monetary Policy Committee dated 20 June 2006, the Committee stated that
there was no significant development that would affect the decision-making
process. However, the increase in the movements in international financial
markets continued to exert pressure on both exchange rates and medium
and long-term interest rates in developing countries beyond the extent im-
plied by economic fundamentals. Meanwhile, it is observed that there are
significant influences parties because of the structure of the portfolio held
by non-residents. Following these developments, the Monetary Policy Com-
mittee (MPC) gathered on 25 June 2006 to assess the developments. At its
meeting of dated 25 July 2006, the Committee has reviewed policy rates and
has decided to further strengthen monetary tightening in order to improve
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medium-term inflationary expectations. Although it is just one event, it is
expected to observe a significant coefficient for MPC variable. Otherwise, the
results are expected to be same with alternative model 1.
4.3 Potential Biases and Limitations
There are several limitations and biases in the estimations that necessitate
results to be interpreted with caution. The main reason for these potential
biases is scarcity of data in the first stage regressions. One obvious bias
is the possibility of survivorship bias. Since the banks that have survived
through the 2000-2001 financial crisis are included in the sample, there is
a high probability of an upward bias in the tests. The banks which are
unhealthy prior to the crisis and bankrupted and/or taken over by Saving
Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) after or during the crisis are excluded from
the sample for two reasons. Unhealthy actions of bankrupted banks can be
anticipated from their balance sheets prior to the financial crisis; hence they
are dropped out because of their aberrant financial actions.
Additionally, since our data start from 1998:Q1, few observations would
have been available for those banks that are failed in the financial crisis in
2001:Q. More precisely, even if they are included in the sample, the results
may also be biased. Therefore, the sample for the tests includes 20 survivor
deposit banks. Thus, probably there exists a bias towards the healthier in-
stitutions in the results.7
Exclusion of development and investment banks, participation banks and
bankrupted banks and using 20 deposit banks may cause a limitation in terms
of degrees of freedom in econometric tests. The first stage regressions are
conducted cross-sectionally, therefore the degrees of freedom poses limitation
7The typical survivorship-bias argument starts from the observation that mutual funds
often disappear following poor performance, however, in the banking literature, there are
few studies that create biases due to survivorship bias (see for example, Demirguc-Kunt et
al., 2000).
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on the robustness of these regressions. To eliminate or reduce this problem,
model 4 is proposed. By decreasing the number of independent variables
included in the test, multicollinearity and degrees of freedom problems are
tried to be reduced. Additionally, in the next section robustness checks are
conducted for a broader investigation.
Another bias related to the first-stage regression is the potential bias in the
level of β. Kashyap and Stein (2000:415) explain this bias with the following
paragraph:
...Because of the demographic factors, some banks have an
advantage at deposit taking, but few good lending opportunities.
Rather than make bad loans, these banks have portfolios that are
skewed towards securities. If the weak lending opportunities are
only imperfectly controlled for by past loan growth, there may be
a tendency for high values of Bit−1 (liquidity variable) to be as-
sociated with slow growth of Lit (loan provision) will be biased
downward.
In the study of Kashyap and Stein (2000) it is also stated that the hy-
pothesis of the study centers on the correlation of β with monetary policy
indicator, hence the bias in the level of betas is not an issue (2002: 415). A
different approach to eliminate this bias is including a demographic dummy
variable in the first stage regression introduced by Campello (2002). This
approach is not pursued in our model since there are problems regarding the
number of independent variables which reduces the degrees of freedom. Hence
there may be a downward bias in sensitivity levels as explained by Kashyap
and Stein (2000).
In the estimation of the sensitivity of each bank on loan growth due to
monetary shock, the use of loan data as a stock variable may have hindered
whether banks stop providing new loans or recall their existing loans due
to say monetary tightening. Since there is no flow data for bank loans, the
impact of monetary shock may be underestimated.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
Results for Alternative Model 1:
Table 5.1 shows the regression results for model 1 with Newey-West HAC
adjustment.1 The coefficient of monetary policy indicator is positive and sig-
nificant. For Turkey, there is a positive relationship between loan growth
sensitivity to liquidity and overnight rates. As interest rates rise (due to
monetary tightening), sensitivity of bank loan growth to liquidity increases.
It is observed that GDP is not a significant variable influencing the loan
growth sensitivity. This may be a consequence of disproportionate growth of
loans and GDP. BRSA dummy which was included to control the influence
of BRSA regulations is found to be significant for 10% level. One may expect
that banks’ loan growth sensitivity may decline in a more regulated period.
As argued by Onis and Alper (2002), “..Excessive holdings of government se-
curities by under-capitalized banks facilitate cheaper financing of the current
government deficit as well as the maturing debt. As a result, the Treasury
faces few incentives to regulate the banks concerned. The fragility of the
system has been accentuated further by the rapid and yet risky behavior of
small-scale banks whose growth has heavily relied on disproportionate hold-
ings of government securities.” However, during the regulated period, Turkish
banks changed their asset portfolios remarkably and increased their concen-
tration on more risk asset, loan. Hence, the period that is examined in this
1*: significant at 10% level, **: significant at 5% level, ***: significant at 1% level.
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Table 5.1: Second stage results for Alternative Model 1
Regression Results
Estimate Std. Error t value p-value
Intercept -0.11938 0.065670 -1.8179 0.07676*
MPt−1 0.12800 0.025151 5.0892 0.00000***
GDPt−1 -0.07737 0.288727 -0.2680 0.79014*
BRSA 0.11614 0.061439 1.8903 0.06617
Test Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.1809
F-statistic 4.093 on 3 and 39 DF
p-value of test 0.01282 **
thesis is mainly the period that banks have held more loan portfolios and
became more sensitive to liquidity shocks initiated by monetary authority.
Results for Alternative Model 2:
The second model tests the influence of monetary policy changes on the
loan growth sensitivity on income from operations. Table 5.2 indicates in-
significant results for this model. Therefore, it is concluded that there is no
significant relationship between income from operations and monetary tight-
ening in Turkey during the sample period. This identification strategy does
not yield significant results for Turkish data. In Turkey, the savers typically
prefer to invest deposit contracts since other financial institutions such as mu-
tual funds and pension funds are very recently active in the market especially
in the large metropolitan areas. However, banks through their branches all
over the country are able to sell insured deposit contracts. Thus, the impact
of possible monetary shock on interest revenues and expenses can be observed
weak through the mechanism introduced by Campello (2002).
Results for Alternative Model 3:
The revised version of the first model is displayed on Table 5.3. With the
government control dummy, the results are more significant and the overall
test is also more significant than the first model. There is a significant pos-
itive relationship between monetary policy indicator and bank loan growth
sensitivity to liquidity. The magnitude of the association between beta and
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Table 5.2: Second stage results for Alternative Model 2
Regression Results
Estimate Std. Error t value p-value
Intercept 0.1967 0.155678 1.2636 0.2139
MPt−1 -0.0758 0.118577 -0.6392 0.5264
GDPt−1 1.6063 0.953918 1.6839 0.1002
BRSA -0.2641 0.168088 -1.5715 0.1242
Test Statistics
Adjusted R2 -0.006503
F-statistic 0.9095 on 3 and 39 DF
p-value of test 0.4452
Table 5.3: Second stage results for Alternative Model 3
Regression Results
Estimate Std. Error t value p-value
Intercept -0.15327 0.06990 -2.1927 0.03436**
MPt−1 0.16357 0.02306 7.0925 0.00000***
GDPt−1 0.13914 0.30859 0.4509 0.65457
BRSA 0.12286 0.06425 1.9123 0.06320*
Test Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.2649
F-statistic 6.044 on 3 and 39 DF
p-value of test 0.00175***
lagged monetary policy is bigger than the association found in the first model.
Similarly BRSA dummy is significant and positively influencing loan growth
sensitivity during the sample period.
Results for Alternative Model 4:
Results of model 4 are shown in Table 5.4. By contrast with the expecta-
tion, it is not possible to conclude that there is an improvement in significance
level for this model. Omitting capitalization and size variables caused insignif-
icant results for the model. The aim of this model is to eliminate (or reduce)
multicollinearity, however it does not yield significant results.
Results for Alternative Model 5:
The model 5 is studied to distinguish different impacts of monetary shocks
among large and small banks. Results for large banks are shown in Table
5.5. There is no significant relationship between large bank sensitivity and
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Table 5.4: Second stage results for Alternative Model 4
Regression Results
Estimate Std. Error t value p-value
Intercept 0.02776 0.05023 0.5526 0.58375
MPt−1 0.03390 0.02712 1.2501 0.21890
GDPt−1 -0.08044 0.30386 -0.2647 0.79264
BRSA 0.10761 0.07427 1.4490 0.15554
Test Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.07303
F-statistic 1.827 3 and 39 DF
p-value of test 0.14370
Table 5.5: Second stage results for Alternative Model 5 - Large Banks
Regression Results
Estimate Std. Error t value p-value
Intercept 0.07999 0.03325 2.4055 0.02099**
MPt−1 -0.03270 0.02127 -1.5373 0.13230
GDPt−1 1.09136 0.17675 6.1747 0.00000***
BRSA -0.04858 0.03144 -1.5453 0.13036
Test Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.02531
F-statistic 1.364 on 3 and 39 DF
p-value of test 0.26810
monetary shocks.2 This is parallel with our expectations and the evidence
on large banks in the literature. In Turkey, large banks are considered as
too big to fail hence especially during the periods that there is financial and
macroeconomic shocks, households and firms prefer to invest their savings to
large banks. Thus, these banks are not affected from monetary shock during
the analyzed period. However, it is observed that the beta coefficient that
describes transmission mechanism is positively related to lagged GDP.
The results for small banks are reported in Table 5.6. There is a significant
relationship between small bank’s liquidity dependence and monetary policy
indicator. Since the coefficient of MPt−1 is positive, it can be concluded that
a rise in interest rates (due to monetary tightening) will lead small banks’
2Removing three government owned banks from data yields similar results. With re-
maining seventeen banks, sensitivity estimates of large banks are found to be not related
with monetary policy changes in this model. Test statistics are also found to be insignifi-
cant. Results are reported in Data Appendix.
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Table 5.6: Second stage results for Alternative Model 5 - Small Banks
Regression Results
Estimate Std. Error t value p-value
Intercept -0.13134 0.05091 -2.580 0.01376**
MPt−1 0.14809 0.02572 5.758 0.00000***
GDPt−1 -0.13174 0.27560 -0.478 0.63531
BRSA 0.114508 0.04471 2.561 0.014420**
Test Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.1494
F-statistic 3.46 on 3 and 39 DF
p-value of test 0.02536**
Table 5.7: Second stage results for Alternative Model 6
Regression Results
Estimate Std. Error t value p-value
Intercept -0.06929 0.05460 -1.2691 0.21213
MPt−1 0.09173 0.02312 3.9669 0.00031***
GDPt−1 0.0409312 0.2543153 0.1609 0.87299
BRSA 0.11786 0.06982 1.6880 0.09961*
Test Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.1612
F-statistic 3.019 on 3 and 39 DF
p-value of test 0.02951**
sensitivity to increase. Since their access to external capital markets is lim-
ited, they are dependent to their internal funds and in this case they are
dependent to their liquid assets. Therefore, in contradictionary monetary
policy periods, it is more likely for small banks to decrease their loan pro-
visions when compared to large banks (which are found to be indifferent to
monetary shocks).
Finally, the model with foreign affiliation dummy is shown in Table 5.7.
The coefficient of overnight rate with Newey-West HAC assumption is found
to be very significant and positive. The sensitivity of bank loan growth on
monetary shock has lesser magnitude as compared to the coefficient found in
model 1.
Overall the results for five alternative models3 lead the following remarks
3The alternative model suggested as (4.8) is also tested but MPC dummy found to be
insignificant and there is no significant change in the test results. Therefore the results are
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to appear:
1. The identification strategy which uses liquidity-sensitivity of bank
(introduced by Kashyap and Stein (2000)) yields significant results
for Turkish data set, while the identification strategy introduced by
Campello (2002) is insignificant for Turkish banking system. From these
findings, it can be concluded that cash-flow-sensitivity of banks are not
significant in terms of monetary policy shocks as expected, and however,
liquidity-sensitivity of banks are significant. Thus, liquidity of banks is
influential on the degree of the impact of monetary tightening.
2. Small banks are more liquidity-sensitive to monetary shocks. Since their
access to external capital markets are expected to be limited, when there
is a monetary tightening, their reserves are influenced and hence their
loan supply decreases. For large banks, it is easier to absorb the impact
of monetary shocks by using alternative external funds. Therefore there
is no significant impact of monetary policy changes on their loan supply.
3. When the ownership type of banks (government vs. private) is con-
trolled, the significance of monetary policy on liquidity-sensitivity in-
creases. This may be a consequence of government banks’ easier access
to alternative external funds or government’s financial funds.
4. Reducing number of exogenous variables and including foreign affilia-
tion dummy to model 4.1 does not yield significant results. Foreign
affiliated banks in Turkey are all categorized in small banks group.4
Since small banks are found to be more sensitive to monetary policy
changes, the influence of affiliations with foreign offices may not be vis-
ible on these banks in Turkey. Distinguishing the influence of their size
and their foreign affiliations on liquidity sensitivity of banks is probably
not reported for this test.
4See Data Appendix for categories and ranking according to asset size of banks.
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not possible with this econometric model for Turkey.
5.1 Robustness Check
In the methodology section, there are models proposed to check the robustness
of the strategy including the model with less parameters and the model with
interaction variables. However, there are some problems related to the nature
of the data set used and the two-stage approach which may need further tests
in terms of robustness. To this end, first step regression approach is studied
as a reduced form model from loan demand and supply functions (see also
Kashyap and Stein (2000)). Thus, the existence of bank lending channel is
examined using the following model:
∆ log(Loans)i,t = αt + γt∆ log(Loans)i,t−1 + β1,tL/Ai,t−1 + λtLog(A)i,t−1
+µtK/Ai,t−1 + ϕMPt−1 + κGDPt−1 + υt (5.1)
Both cross-sectional and time-series variables are included in the model
hence there is a panel data set for the econometric analysis of the above
model.5 For the estimation of the ϕ coefficient, fixed-effects model is used.
Therefore the variables are “time-demeaned”. The short representation of
the equation is:
(yit − y¯i) = α + β(Xit − X¯i) + ζit (5.2)
where yit is the loan growth of bank i at time t and y¯i is the time-series mean
of loan growth of bank i. X is the matrix of explanatory variables. Table 5.8
reports the fixed effect estimations of (5.1).
Test is found to be significant and critical variables are also significant in-
cluding monetary policy indicator and liquidity proxy variables. The negative
and significant coefficient of overnight rate confirms the negative impact of
5Newey and West (1987) HAC is assumed for the robustness tests.
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Table 5.8: Fixed Effect Estimation Results for Robustness Test 5.1
Regression Results
Estimate Std. Error t value p-value
Intercept -0.00072 0.00233 -0.3079 0.75822
∆ log(Loans)i,t−1 -0.09433 0.11667 -0.8085 0.41901
L/Ai,t−1 0.08738 0.02546 3.4320 0.00062***
Log(A)i,t−1 -0.04811 0.01710 -2.8143 0.00500***
K/Ai,t−1 -0.07236 0.05143 -1.4071 0.15976
MPt−1 -0.05138 0.02152 -2.3880 0.01715**
GDPt−1 0.48020 0.07422 6.4696 0.00000***
Test Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.1496
F-statistic 25.9 on 6 and 843 DF
p-value of test 2.2e-16***
their rise to loan growth. As interest rates rise, loan growth decreases. GDP
and liquidity of banks are positively related to the loan growth which confirms
the theoretical explanations. Size is found negatively related to loan growth
which is an interesting result. As size of the bank gets larger, the growth of
loans gets smaller. However, as the amount of loan provided increases when
banks are larger (larger asset size), the growth of these larger banks’ loans
would be lower rate as compared to smaller banks.
Another robustness test is conducted to check the results for alternative
model 5, which compares (or distinguishes) large and small banks’ sensitivi-
ties. Since there are seven large banks chosen for this study, subsampling the
data set and conducting two-stage regressions on seven large banks and on
remaining thirteen banks generates serious problems in terms of degrees of
freedom. Hence the two-step approach is used to compare to large and small
banks with the help of an interaction variable as explained in previous section.
With the panel data and fixed-effect estimations, it is possible to subsample
the data and run separate regressions on large and small banks without facing
the problem of degrees of freedom. Hence, large banks are separately tested
as in the form of equation (5.1) and the results are displayed in Table 5.9.
Regression results for robustness check of large banks imply that there
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Table 5.9: Fixed Effect Estimation Results - Subsample of Large Banks
Regression Results
Estimate Std. Error t value p-value
Intercept -0.00154 0.00302 -0.5103 0.61020
∆ log(Loans)i,t−1 -0.04462 0.10220 -0.4366 0.66270
L/Ai,t−1 0.11193 0.02314 4.8365 0.00000***
Log(A)i,t−1 -0.01199 0.01281 -0.9361 0.35000
K/Ai,t−1 -0.11517 0.11443 -1.0065 0.31500
MPt−1 -0.00154 0.00812 -0.1899 0.84950
GDPt−1 0.48773 0.08210 5.9407 0.00000***
Test Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.2497
F-statistic 17.64 on 6 and 294 DF
p-value of test 2.2e-16***
Table 5.10: Fixed Effect Estimation Results - Subsample of Small Banks
Regression Results
Estimate Std. Error t value p-value
Intercept -0.00020 0.00329 -0.0622 0.95041
∆ log(Loans)i,t−1 -0.09785 0.119872 -0.8163 0.41468
L/Ai,t−1 0.09514 0.05003 1.9019 0.05771*
Log(A)i,t−1 -0.06040 0.02073 -2.9145 0.00371***
K/Ai,t−1 -0.07172 0.05589 -1.2833 0.19992
MPt−1 -0.07550 0.03113 -2.4255 0.01561**
GDPt−1 0.46434 0.09818 4.7294 0.00000***
Test Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.1423
F-statistic 16.16 on 6 and 542 DF
p-value of test 2.2e-16 ***
is no significant relationship with large banks’ loan growth and monetary
tightening. This result confirms the finding of two-stage strategy for large
banks. In the fixed effects model, lagged values of liquid asset-to-asset ratio
and GDP are found to be significantly and positively related to loan growth for
large banks.6 Liquid large banks have higher loan growth rate as compared to
less-liquid large banks. Increasing GDP has positive impact on loan growth.
The results for robustness check for small banks are shown in Table 5.10.
Monetary policy changes have significant and negative impact on loan
6This test is repeated for large banks when three government-owned banks excluded to
test the two-stage strategy which excludes government banks. The results are similar to
the findings of two-stage strategy. The results are reported in data appendix section.
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growth of small banks. This result is again parallel with the findings of
Model 5 on small banks. GDP and liquidity is positively related to loan
growth similar to the results found for equation (5.1). These results confirm
the robustness of models 1 and model 5 and the remarks driven from their
findings. Hence, there is an impact of monetary policy shocks on small banks
and liquidity is significant characteristics when there is monetary tighten-
ing in Turkey. However, the data limitation on the estimations of first-step
coefficients remains for cautions interpretations of the findings.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This thesis investigates bank lending channel by identifying the influence of
monetary policy shocks on loan growth sensitivities of 20 Turkish deposit
banks in the period 1998-2009. Turkish banking sector has gone through a
radical restructuring program after the financial crisis of 2000-2001. The foun-
dation of BRSA provided a new regulatory environment for Turkish banking
system. Restructuring state-owned banks and changing the financial require-
ments of Turkish banks are argued to improve the banking system in general
and reduce the fragility of the sector. Therefore, the decade of 1998-2009 is an
interesting period to investigate the loan growth and the impact of monetary
policy shocks on loan growth. This period is investigated in three main areas
in this thesis:
1. Are monetary policy shocks influential on loan growth of banks in this
new environment?
2. Which bank characteristics increase sensitivity of loan growth?
3. Is there a visible difference between small and large banks in terms of
their loan growth sensitivities?
Following the two-stage strategy of Kashyap and Stein (2000), Campello
(2002) and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008), different sensitivities of banks are
regressed on monetary policy indicator - overnight rate. The findings suggest
evidence on liquidity-sensitivity of Turkish banks during the sample period.
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The monetary policy shocks causes banks to become more dependent (or sen-
sitive) to their liquid funds. This relationship is more obvious for small banks.
Since it is harder for them to reach alternative external funds, monetary tight-
ening increases their dependence on their liquid funds. And consequently, it
may be hard for them to make loan provisions. This is another evidence
for bank lending channel to be valid in Turkey. As in most of the previous
studies, there may be an identification problem in the empirical evidence of
this thesis. The bank lending channel suggests that monetary shock influence
on loan supply of banks. However, the empirical model used in this thesis
cannot identify whether the impact of monetary policy is on loan demand or
supply. Nevertheless, by the help of bank characteristics including bank size,
it is found that narrow monetary transmission mechanism is valid in Turkey.
One of the main missions and objectives of Central Bank is to keep the
stability of the economy. It also includes the stability of short and long term
interest rates. Since there is a relatively stable period for Turkish economy,
bank lending channel and its consequences may not be important. But in this
study, it is found that there is a degree of sensitivity in deposit banks. The
magnitude of the sensitivity cannot be determined from the results however it
is identified a relationship between monetary policy shocks and loan growth.
Therefore, sustaining stability is significant for Turkish banks to sustain their
fragility and current loan provisions. Abandoning or reducing inflation tar-
geting monetary policy adjustments is also helpful to keep the stability in the
banking sector.
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APPENDIX A
DATA APPENDIX
Table A.1: List of 19 Deposit Banks (as of December 31, 2008, in million TL)
Total No. of No. of Category
Assets Branches Employees
T.C. Ziraat Bankasi 104,412 1,269 21,299 State-owned
Is Bankasi 97,552 1,039 20,924 Private
Garanti Bankasi 88,941 726 16,350 Private
Akbank 85,655 868 15,127 Private
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi 63,723 861 14,795 Private
Vakiflar Bankasi 52,193 525 9,567 State-owned
Halk Bankasi 51,096 622 12,467 State-owned
Finans Bank 26,573 458 9,986 Foreign
Denizbank 19,225 400 7,376 Foreign
ING Bank 16,503 366 6,357 Foreign
Turk Ekonomi Bankasi 14,736 336 6,400 Private
HSBC Bank 14,696 335 6,853 Foreign
Fortis Bank 11,915 300 5,378 Foreign
Sekerbank 8,041 250 4,089 Private
Citibank 5,451 56 2,315 Foreign
Alternatif Bank 3,745 46 1,006 Private
Eurobank Tekfen 3,481 42 661 Foreign
Anadolubank 3,384 77 1,718 Private
Tekstil Bankasi 2,953 60 1,410 Private
Kocbank is not reported since it has merged with Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi in
2006.
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APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL TESTS
Two-Stage Regression Approach excluding
Government-Owned Banks
The data set for the test does not cover the variables for three government
banks and the first stage of the model has the following form:
∆ log(Loans)i,t = αt + γt∆ log(Loans)i,t−1 + β5,tL/Ai,t−1 + β6,tL/A · SDi
+λtLog(A)i,t−1 + µtK/Ai,t−1 + εi,t
The interaction variable is included in order to capture the specific influ-
ence of monetary policy shocks to small and large banks’ sensitivities. The
second stage of the model is:
βj,t = φ+ ϕMPt−1 + κGDPt−1 + θBRSA+ υt
The results for small banks are same with the results shown in Table 5.6,
since removing government banks from the data does not change the data set
for small banks. Government-owned banks are all included in the large banks
data set, hence only the results for large banks will be shown in this section.
The results are insignificant and hence strengthens the remarks and con-
clusions made on large banks. Estimation results are done with Newey-West
HAC (1987).
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Table B.1: Second stage results for Alternative Model 5 - Large Banks
Regression Results
Estimate Std. Error t value p-value
Intercept 0.053729 0.139139 0.3862 0.7015
MPt−1 0.012004 0.214534 0.0560 0.9557
GDPt−1 1.553868 1.309082 1.1870 0.2424
BRSA -0.153524 0.143918 -1.0667 0.2926
Test Statistics
Adjusted R2 -0.01994
F-statistic 0.7263 on 3 and 39 DF
p-value of test 0.5425
Fixed-Effect Model
The fixed effect model on large banks as reported in Table 5.9 is repeated
by excluding government owned banks from the data set. The results for this
robustness test is shown in Table A.3.
Table B.2: Fixed Effect Esitmation Results for Robustness
Regression Results
Estimate Std. Error t value p-value
Intercept -0.00187 0.00264 -0.7116 0.47771
∆ log(Loans)i,t−1 -0.10558 0.07715 -1.3683 0.17307
L/Ai,t−1 -0.00101 0.05938 -0.0170 0.98643
Log(A)i,t−1 -0.02561 0.01233 -2.0770 0.03935 **
K/Ai,t−1 -0.36882 0.14524 -2.5393 0.01203 **
MPt−1 -0.00272 0.00918 -0.2967 0.76710
GDPt−1 0.60029 0.14358 4.1807 0.0000 ***
Test Statistics
Adjusted R2 0.2724
F-statistic 11.67 on 6 and 165 DF
p-value of test 7.022e-11 ***
The results confirm the findings of two-stage strategy and robustness
checks for large banks when government owned banks are excluded from the
analysis. Monetary policy changes are not influential on loan growth of large
banks in Turkey. Size and capitalization characteristics of banks are found
to be significantly negatively related to loan growth and GDP is positively
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related to large banks’ loan growth.
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APPENDIX C
DESCRIPTION OF
VARIABLES
Change in Log Loans: This variable is computed by taking natu-
ral logarithms of Total Loans reported on the balance sheets of banks
(www.tbb.org.tr) and then by taking first differences of log values.
Liquidity: It is the Liquid Assets to Total Assets ratio of banks as reported
in their balance sheets. First lag of this variable is taken.
Size: It is computed as the natural logarithm of Total Assets of the bank.
First lag of this variable is taken.
Capitalization Ratio: It is the Shareholders’ Equity to Total Assets ratio
as reported in the balance sheets of banks.
Income: It is ratio of Net Income (Loss) to Total Loans of banks.
Monetary Policy Indicator: Overnight rates are used as monetary pol-
icy indicator and the values are obtained from Central Bank of Turkey.
(www.tcmb.gov.tr) The values are determined daily and averaged for quar-
terly analysis.
GDP: This variable is the nominal Gross Domestic Product of Turkey re-
ported by Turkish Statistical Institute (www. tuik.gov.tr).
GD: Government control dummy. It takes a value of 1 when bank is owned
by government and takes 0 value otherwise.
SD: Size dummy. It takes a value of 1 when bank is large bank and takes 0
value otherwise.
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F: Foreign affiliation dummy. It takes a value of 1 when bank is affiliated to
foreign bank and takes 0 value otherwise.
BRSA: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency control dummy. It
takes value of 1 for period 1998Q1:2000Q3 and value of 0 for period
2000Q4:2009Q1.
MPC: Dummy for Monetary Policy Meeting in June 2006. It takes a value
of 1 when time is second quarter of 2006 and takes 0 value otherwise.
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